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This article analyses the organizational structure as well as the characteristics of
development finance provided by Arab donor countries. This is done with a
comparative view in relation to western donors and with the aim to develop
recommendations as to how Arab development finance can be strengthened and
rendered more effective for the new Millennium. In the 1960s and 1970s Arab donors
established a variety of national and multilateral agencies. These agencies share many
characteristics of their western counterparts, but some also exhibit distinctive features.
Both in terms of absolute volume as well as generosity measured by aid as a percentage
of GDP, Arab countries have been important donors in the past, even though recent
years have seen a significant fall in Arab aid. Reversing this downfall in aid, targeting
its aid better towards the poor and very poor recipient countries and raising the grant
share and the concessionality of loans for these countries together with a reallocation of
aid towards the social sectors of human development would render Arab aid-giving
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more effective in terms of poverty alleviation and more in line with western aid. A
greater willingness to participate in the ongoing discussions amongst western donors
about the proper objectives and design of development finance would help Arab
donors to achieve the recognition they truly deserve. Closer cooperation with western
donors would be a logical consequence of taking such a step. However, this would also
need to be matched by a greater willingness on the part of western donors to take their
Arab counterparts seriously as partners of development finance.1
1 Introduction
Arab development finance represents a somewhat neglected aspect. Whilst naturally
being much smaller than western aid in absolute terms, Arab countries have been
generous donors in the past and an important source of development finance. They are
also the only significant providers of development finance other than western developed
countries. Similar to the western world, a complex range of national and multilateral
agencies have been established to manage Arab aid. After a presentation of the
organizational structure of Arab aid and development finance, its characteristics are
analysed with a comparative view towards western aid donors, organized in the
Organization of Economic Cooperation’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-
DAC).1 Whilst Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Qatar also provide aid, the major Arab donors
are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The other Arab
countries are recipient countries rather than donors and not least major recipients of
Arab aid.
We analyse Arab aid in terms of motives behind the allocation of aid, absolute volume,
relative generosity, allocation across regions and income groups, financial terms, the
dependency of recipient countries on aid, the role of export promotion, the sectoral
distribution as well as the engagement of donors in discussions of the proper objectives
and design of development finance. We mainly concentrate on aid or, in the
terminology of the OECD, official development assistance (ODA), which is defined as
grants as well as highly concessional loans (that is, loans with a grant element of at least
25 per cent) that are ‘undertaken by the official sector’, administered with the
‘promotion of the economic development and welfare’ of the recipient countries as its
main objective (OECD 2002b: 294). In the final section we propose various
recommendations on how Arab aid can be re-designed for the twenty-first century with
a view towards strengthening it and rendering it more effective in terms of poverty
alleviation in recipient countries.
2 The organizational structure of Arab aid and development finance
2.1 The national agencies
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the three Arab donors to have
national aid agencies. None of the other smaller Arab donors like Algeria, Libya, Iraq or
Qatar have such agencies.2 All three national agencies share a number of characteristics.
They provide a whole range of finance to recipient countries, including grants, loans,
guarantees and technical assistance. They also channel some of their aid through
multilateral agencies, either Arab agencies (discussed further below) or multilateral
development banks such as the African Development Bank or the World Bank’s
International Development Association. This works via contributing to the capital
stocks of such agencies. It is noteworthy that often the majority of annual aid allocated
                                                
1 With the accession of Greece, the OECD-DAC now comprises 22 countries, namely the 15 member
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Australia and New Zealand.
2 Iraq had an Iraqi Fund for External Development in the 1970s, but it ceased to distribute aid in 1982
(Van den Boogaerde 1991).2
by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE is not channelled through these agencies, but
through the Finance Ministry or even some more or less secret funds at the discretion of
the ruling families (Nonneman 1988; Van den Boogaerde 1991). This is particularly the
case for Saudi Arabia.
2.1.1 The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development was the first national Arab aid
agency to be established in 1961, right at the start of the independence of Kuwait. As its
name would suggest, it was initially established to give aid exclusively to Arab
countries. However, since 1974 its mandate has been extended to allow provision of aid
to all developing countries. The Kuwait Fund has always assumed the role of a kind of
role model and pioneer for other Arab aid agencies to follow. It has also taken pride in
this role. In a promotional book by McKinnon (1997: 79) it is regarded ‘a testament to
the success of the Kuwait Fund that so many other Arab development funds have used it
as a model’. It is also the most important national agency providing cumulative gross
development finance worth US$9.3 billion by 1997 (Coordination Secretariat 1998).
2.1.2 The Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
The United Arab Emirates followed the example of Kuwait in creating the Abu Dhabi
Fund for Arab Economic Development in 1971. The Fund no longer restricts its aid
giving to Arab countries, however, and changed its name to Abu Dhabi Fund for
Development. Compared to the Kuwait Fund, the cumulative gross development finance
provided until 1997 is relatively small at US$1.7 billion (Coordination Secretariat
1998).
2.1.3 The Saudi Fund for Development
The Saudi Fund for Development never had a restriction to Arab countries in its name,
which is not surprising as at the time of its creation in 1974 Arab donors started to give
money to non-Arab countries as well. Of the three national agencies, it is the only one to
have inserted the objective of finance and guarantee of Saudi non-oil exports into its
Charter. It is therefore more than a pure development finance organization. Its
cumulative gross development finance amounts to around US$6.5 billion by 1997
(Coordination Secretariat 1998). This is clearly lower than the respective figure from
the Kuwait Fund. Note, however, that more Saudi Arabian aid and development finance
are provided outside the realm of the Saudi Fund than is the case for Kuwait, making
Saudi Arabia the biggest Arab donor.
2.2 The multilateral agencies
Multilateral agencies represent the combined and coordinated effort of Arab donors to
provide development finance. Contrary to the national agencies, the multilateral
agencies provide almost exclusively (low-interest) loans and guarantees, but hardly any
grants at all, mostly in the form of technical assistance. Suggestive of such difference is
already the fact that some of the multilateral agencies are called banks (Arab Bank for
Economic Development in Africa and Islamic Development Bank) rather than funds.
We will include here two agencies, namely the Islamic Development Bank and the
OPEC Fund for International Development, which strictly speaking are not exclusively
Arab multilateral agencies, but the Arab members of both are by far the major
contributors.3
2.2.1 The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)
Of the multilateral Arab aid agencies, the AFESD with headquarters in Kuwait City is
the oldest and one of the most important one. Its cumulative disbursed gross
development finance amounts to around US$7.8 billion by 2001 (AFESD 2002). Its
establishing agreement was signed in 1968, but it started operations only in 1974 (van
den Boogaerde 1991). It is an exclusively Arab organization as participating countries
must be members of the League of Arab States. Besides project finance, the AFESD
also participates in the equity capital of corporations, establishes or administers special
funds, promotes inter-Arab investment and provides expertise and technical assistance.
It also hosts the Coordination Secretariat for Arab National and Regional Development
Institutions (see further below).
2.2.2 The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)
BADEA, with headquarters in Khartoum (Sudan), assumed operations in 1975. As its
name would suggest, its objective is to provide development finance to countries, which
are members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but not the League of Arab
States. In 1976, BADEA took over the management of the Special Arab Aid Fund for
Africa (SAAFA), whose resources were merged with BADEA’s in 1977. SAAFA was
created in 1973 to help overcome balance of payments difficulties of African countries,
particularly with respect to financing oil imports. With the merging into BADEA, this
type of development finance was suspended. In 1997, BADEA issued a decision
allocating US$50 million for the finance of Arab-African trade, which is administered
by the Islamic Development Bank. By 2000 BADEA had disbursed gross development
finance worth US$1.17 billion (BADEA 2002).
2.2.3 The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and the Arab Trade Financing Programme
(ATFP)
The AMF, established in 1976 with headquarters in Abu Dhabi (UAE), provides
assistance exclusively to Arab countries in order to overcome balance of payments
difficulties. It also provides the Secretariat for the Council of Governors of Arab Central
Banks and Monetary Agencies and, like the IMF, publishes a joint Arab Economic
Report on the state of the economy in member countries. In 1989 it created the ATFP,
which provides export and import credits for the promotion of inter-Arab trade. The
ATFP also organizes buyer-seller meetings and trade information points as part of its
inter-Arab trade information network.
2.2.4 The Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (IAIGC)
The IAIGC operates the Arab Investment Guarantee scheme, aimed at encouraging
Arab investors to invest in other Arab countries, and the Export Credit Guarantee
Scheme, which aims at promoting inter-Arab trade. In addition, the IAIGC promotes
inter-Arab investment with a range of schemes aimed at providing information about
investment opportunities.
2.2.5 The Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organization
(AGFUND)
Established in 1981 with headquarters in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), the AGFUND aims to
provide finance for social, health, education and other ‘soft’ sectors in cooperation with
United Nations agencies as well as other multilateral and national donors. Van den4
Boogaerde (1991: 19) reports that US$176 million had been disbursed by the AGFUND
until 1989. More recent data are not available.
2.2.6 The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID)
The AAAID with headquarters in Khartoum (Sudan) was established in 1977 in order to
boost agricultural production in Arab countries via investments in animal and plant
production, agricultural processing and marketing. It is a major shareholder of more
than 20 agricultural companies. The concern of Arab countries about agricultural self-
sufficiency has prompted them to establish or finance other institutions with agricultural
objectives as well. For example, Arab countries have been major contributors to the
United Nations International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), established in
1977. Also, one of the minor components of the Islamic Development Bank group is the
Biosaline Agriculture Centre in Dubai (UAE), which was established in 1999 and
aspires to develop and promote the use of sustainable agriculture using saline water. As
we will see further below, around one-fifth of Arab development finance is devoted to
agriculture and livestock production.
2.2.7The Islamic Development Bank (IDB)
The IDB with headquarters in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) also started operations in 1975. It
provides concessionary and non-concessionary loans to member countries of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). By 2000 its cumulative gross
disbursements of development finance had reached US$14.8 billion (IDB 2002),
making it the single biggest Arab agency donor. Like the World Bank Group, the IDB is
more a group of development finance organizations with different administrative
arrangements and operational rules than one single bank and also calls itself the IDB
group. Its main components are the IDB Unit Investment Fund (UIF), the IDB
Infrastructure Fund, the Islamic Corporation for Insurance of Investment and Export
Credit (ICIEC) and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of Private Sector
(ICD). The UIF, established in 1989, is the private sector window of the IDB. One of its
main objective is to raise money through several modes of Islamic financing that are
compatible with Shari’ah rules, that is, with the beliefs and the rules of conduct
mandated by Islam. By far the most important of these Islamic financing modes is
Murabaha, where one partner buys a good and sells it on to the other partner on a cost-
plus basis with the profit to the seller and repayment by the buyer specified in the initial
contract. The IDB Infrastructure Fund was established in 1999 to make equity and
equity-related investments in infrastructure projects and infrastructure-related industries.
The ICIECD, established in 1984, provides export credit and investment insurance. The
ICD was established in 2000 and complements the UIF in providing Shari’ah
compatible financial products and services as well as expanding the access of private
companies to Islamic capital markets. In addition, the IDB has a trade finance and
promotion department whose objective is the promotion of trade among IDB member
countries for which import finance (US$4 billion) and export finance (US$200 million)
are provided. The IDB is also the manager of the Islamic Banks Portfolio for Investment
and Development (IBP), established in 1987, which aims to mobilize liquidity for
Islamic banks and to develop an Islamic financial market. Of all the Arab and Arab-
dominated donors, the IDB group currently seems to be by far the most vibrant and
active one, having recently created many special organizations, which extend the IDB’s
area of activity.5
2.2.8 The OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID)
The OFID was established in 1976 and, like the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) itself, has its headquarters in Vienna. In addition to the usual project
and programme loans, OFID also provides loans for balance of payments support and
for debt reduction within the framework of the World Bank’s and the IMF’s initiative
for highly indebted poor countries (HIPC initiative). By 2001 OFID had disbursed gross
development finance amounting to US$3.1 billion (OFID 2002).
2.3 The Coordination Secretariat
In 1975 a Coordination Secretariat for Arab National and Regional Development
Institutions was established under the auspices of the AFESD. It brings together the
eight most important aid agencies of the Arab world: The Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Saudi
Fund, the AFESD, BADEA, the IDB, the AMF and the OFID. There is substantial co-
financing of projects among the agencies of the Coordination Secretariat as well as,
albeit less so, with western donors and western-dominated institutions such as the
World Bank. However, the Secretariat’s objective is very limited. Its main function
seems to be to collect and disseminate statistical information about Arab aid giving. It
does not have its own website. Neither does it publish the statistical information online.
2.4 Comparison with western agencies and western-dominated institutions
One cannot help observing some striking similarities between Arab and western aid and
development finance institutions. The national aid agencies, the AFESD, BADEA and
the OFID are the counterpart to the western national agencies and multilateral
organizations such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). The counterpart to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), albeit on a much smaller scale of course. In many respects
the IDB is organized along the lines of the World Bank. The IDB has its own currency,
called the Islamic Dinar, but it is nothing else but the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights
(SDR) in disguise as one Islamic Dinar is equivalent in value to one SDR. Like the
World Bank Group, there is an Islamic Development Bank Group. One of the Group’s
members is the Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector, established in
1999, which is the counterpart to the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation.
The IDB also has a young professionals programme similar to the World Bank. The
Arab donors even have a Coordination Secretariat, which is roughly comparable to the
OECD’s DAC even though the DAC is more important as a coordinating forum of
national aid agencies and produces much more comprehensive statistical information
and policy documents.
As is the case with western donors, a certain amount of overlap and duplication in Arab
development finance is also clearly observable. This stems from the multiple functions
Arab donors fulfil. As Arab countries they want to give special attention to other Arab
countries and as Muslim countries to other Muslim countries; hence, for example, the
existence of separate trade financing programmes for fostering inter-Arab and inter-
Muslim trade. Or take the special relations with African countries as another example:
Arab donors give aid to African countries via the BADEA, but as OPEC members also
via the OFID and, if the recipient country is predominantly Muslim, via the IDB as well.6
3 The characteristics of Arab aid: a comparative analysis with OECD-DAC aid
3.1 Motives for aid giving and allocation
The motives for Arab aid giving and allocation have been controversially discussed in
the literature. Scholars from western countries have often been critical, whereas
representatives from the Arab world have been more positive in their assessment,
insisting that Arab aid is less motivated by donor interest and more beneficial to
developing countries than western aid. Representative of the western critical view is, for
example, Hunter (1984: 58) who states that ‘the aid policies of the Arab members of
OPEC have been motivated first and foremost by their security, politico-ideological and
economic objectives’. Representative for the competing Arab view is Shihata
(1982: 203f.) who stresses the generosity of Arab aid-giving, its untied status, supposed
‘geographical diversity’ and difference to aid from western donors, which ‘usually
confine it to countries that are of obvious economic or political interest’ to them in order
to achieve such ‘typical objectives as securing markets for their products or sources of
raw materials, preserving former influence, attempting to acquire new influence, or at
least ensuring the neutrality of the aid recipient’.
What are possible motives for Arab countries to give aid and to allocate the aid flows
the way they are allocated? To start, Arab countries have always been and still are the
main beneficiaries of such aid. Indeed, in the very early years often only Arab countries
were eligible for Arab aid. For example, only Arab countries were eligible for the
receipt of aid from the Kuwait and the Abu Dhabi Fund until 1974. Still today the
AFESD gives aid exclusively to Arab countries. Arab countries like to portray this as a
living example of active Arab solidarity of the donor countries with their poorer cousins
(Achilli and Khaldi 1984). More critical voices see it as the attempt to buy off a threat
by more populous, envious and greedy neighbours in inducing them to believe that
friendly relations are more rewarding than hostility would be (Hunter 1984). However,
generally speaking, eligibility and the range of recipient countries widened substantially
after the very early periods of Arab aid allocation.
In addition to Arab countries, many observers also suggest that Sub-Saharan African
countries are favoured due to the pursuit of Afro-Arab unity and the traditionally strong
links between these countries and Arab countries (Simmons 1981: 16). Many Arab
countries are located in Africa, have shared a history of colonization with African
countries and have generally supported nationalist liberation movements against the
colonization powers. Again, a potential pro-African preference is suggested by the
existence of such organizations as BADEA.
Besides Arab and African solidarity, another potential preference suggested by, for
example, Mertz and Mertz (1983) and Hunter (1984) is with respect to Islamic
countries. Khaldi (1984: 13) rejects the suggestion that Islamic countries might be
favoured by Arab aid in claiming that ‘Arab aid does not have any religious character’.
However, suggestive of such potential preference is the existence of such multilateral
agencies as the IDB. A middle position is taken by Porter (1986: 63) who believes that
the ‘Islamic connection’, whilst existent, ‘appears to be of relatively small significance
among the motivations underlying the Arab aid effort and its distribution’.
Turning towards more directly political factors potentially influencing Arab aid
allocation, Mertz and Mertz (1983: 21) claim that ‘political interests dictate the7
distribution of Arab aid’ such that aid allocation might be biased towards countries that
are similar in their foreign political positions, in particular with respect to issues
concerning the Israel-Arab conflict (similarly, Simmons [1981]). An example of such a
position is a statement by its Foreign Minister in 1985 that Kuwait will not give any aid
to countries that establish or re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel
(Nonneman 1988: 152). However, the claim that political interests heavily influence the
distribution of Arab aid is again rejected by Al-Ani (1984: 42) who states that many of
the recipient countries do not have diplomatic relations with OPEC (and therefore Arab)
donor countries.
Finally, Arab donors, like many other aid donors, suggest that they take the need of
potential recipient countries into account in favouring poorer countries. For example,
Al-Humaidi (1984: 60) states that it has been the general policy of the Kuwait Fund to
favour ‘those countries of the developing world which are more in need of assistance
than others’. Similarly, Humaidan (1984: 69) claims that the Saudi Fund for
Development ‘has tried to focus the benefits of its assistance predominantly on the
poorest countries, those having very low per capita income’. The website of the OFID
assures its visitors that whilst all developing countries are in principle eligible for Fund
assistance ‘the least developed countries (…) are accorded higher priority’ (OFID
2002).
3.2 Absolute volume
Table 1 provides an overview of the development of Arab country and multilateral
agency aid in the form of net ODA disbursements and net other official flows (OOF) in
comparison to the analogous stream of finance provided by OECD-DAC countries over
the period 1974 to 2000. OOF comprise other flows of finance to recipient countries
that do not meet the conditions of ODA ‘either because they are not primarily aimed at
development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25 per cent’ (OECD
2002b: 294).
Note that no data for individual countries or agencies are available after 1989.3 Also,
these data stem from OECD estimates. As Iqbal (1983: 31) notes, OECD estimates have
tended ‘to diverge from indications provided by certain national authorities. These
divergences can largely be attributed to differences in the definition of assistance and
coverage, and have probably led to underestimates in the DAC figures’. Some donors,
particularly Saudi Arabia, also keep a part of their aid giving secret (Nonneman 1988;
Van den Boogaerde 1991).
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the information contained in Table 1. First,
the total amount of aid given is substantial. The vast majority of this aid stems from
only four countries (in order of importance): Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates. Smaller amounts come from Algeria, Libya, Qatar and in past years from Iraq
as well. Second, the amount of OOF is small compared to ODA and becomes negligible
or even negative in the 1990s. This suggests that ODA is the greatly dominating part of
development finance provided by Arab donors. Third, the amount of aid given is
volatile and changes quite substantially from period to period. There is much more
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volatility in Arab aid than there is in aid given by OECD-DAC countries. Fourth, there
is a substantial fall in the amount of Arab aid given in the second half of the 1980s and
the 1990s. For the Arab agencies the net ODA figures even turn negative between 1995
and 1999, suggesting that more money flew back to the agencies in the form of
repayments than were newly given out. Note that part of the sharp downfall in aid in the
early 1990s is due to incomplete data: Until 1992, the aggregate Arab country data
comprise the combined total for Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates. From 1993 to 1996 the data cover Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE only, from 1997 onwards data for the UAE are not included. However, given
that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are by far the major Arab
donors, it is clear that the major explanation for the rather sharp downfall in Arab aid in
the 1990s must lie somewhere else. We will come back to this point again further
below. As concerns the Arab multilateral agencies, the data comprise the combined total
for BADEA, AFEDS, the IDB and the OFID. Fifth, the amount of Arab aid has been
quite substantial in the past compared to DAC bilateral aid, reaching around half of
DAC aid in the late 1970s. Sixth, if taken over the whole period or looking only at the
last 15 years or so, Arab aid is relatively small compared to DAC aid, however. Still,
Table 1
Net development finance in current million US$
1975-95 1980-84 1985-90 1990-94 1995-99
Net official development assistance (ODA)
Arab countries 5,238.1 5,710.8 2,618.2 2,137.5 464.0
Algeria 76.6 83.4 51.7 na na
Iraq 263.1 218.3 -17.7 na na
Libya 158.4 164.9 81.5 na na
Qatar 199.5 138.9 5.5 na na
Kuwait 984.8 1,101.1 415.7 na na
of which: Kuwait Fund 188.9 332.7 139.0 na na
Saudi Arabia 3,526.0 4,299.5 2,250.5 na na
of which: Saudi Fund 149.6 255.3 79.5 na na
UAE 991.8 561.2 41.8 na na
of which: Abu Dhabi Fund 76.9 53.7 -43.3 na na
Arab agencies 578.3 305.2 108.3 190.4 -13.2
AFESD 108.2 79.3 122.5 na na
IDB 108.4 121.2 -22.6 na na
OFID 111.6 198.6 -13.2 na na
BADEA 29.6 33.5 13.8 na na
DAC 10,869.9 17,684.9 28,030.4 41,448.7 37,731.3
Total Arab ODA as % of DAC ODA 54.1 34.47 10.36 5.76 1.22
Net other official flows (OOF)
Arab countries 794.9 769.6 -163.8 50.5 na
Arab agencies 47.6 41.4 40.3 -11.5 na
DAC 2,387.2 4,456.9 4,217.0 7,595.3 9,336.6
Total Arab OOF as % of DAC OOF 35.30 18.20 na 0.51 na
Net OOF as % of net ODA
Arab countries 15.18 13.48 na 2.36
Arab agencies 8.23 13.56 37.21 na
DAC 21.96 25.20 15.04 18.32 24.74
Note: na: not available or not applicable.
Source: Van den Boogaerde (1991); OECD (2002a).9
one needs to put things into perspective. Arab countries are fewer and poorer than their
OECD-DAC counterparts. Also, whilst Arab countries are not the only donors of aid
other than the western countries organized in the OECD-DAC, they are the only major
ones. Other donors such as Iceland, Turkey, the Czech Republic, India, South Korea,
China and Taiwan provide only very small amounts and, with the exception of Iceland,
are recipients of aid flows themselves.
What are the reasons for the volatility of total Arab aid that was already mentioned?
Column I of Table 2 provides estimation results from a simple econometric model with
the log of total Arab net ODA over the period 1971 to 1997 as the dependent variable
combined oil and natural gas revenue of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates (taken from World Bank 2001), a dummy variable for the years after the
Second Gulf War as well as combined oil and natural gas revenue of Kuwait, Saudi
Arabia and United Arab Emirates (taken from World Bank 2001), a dummy variable for
the years after the Second Gulf War as well as a time trend as the independent variables.
Note that the aid and natural resource rents values have been converted into US dollars
of 1995 with the help of the IMF’s world unit import price index. Standard errors are
robust towards arbitrary serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The estimated
elasticity for the oil and natural gas rents is 0.8, which clearly shows the dependence
and strong sensitivity of the total amount of aid given towards the total revenue of Arab
donors from their natural resource extraction. The Gulf War dummy is also highly
significant and negative. This variable captures the effect that Arab countries had to
contribute enormous amounts of money for their war and post-war efforts, which
reduced their willingness to give aid. Note that the time trend is of importance, but not
outstandingly so. The R-squared for our model falls from 0.8 to 0.6 if the dependent
variable is detrended as suggested by Wooldridge (2000: 337). This suggests that the
volatility of the resource rents and the exogenous shock of the Second Gulf War are the
main determinants of the volatility in total Arab aid flows.
Table 2
The determinants of the total volume of Arab aid
II I
Dependent variable: ln (total Arab net ODA) ln (Arab net ODA as % of GNI)




















R-squared detrended 0.61 0.31
Note: Robust t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.10
3.3 Generosity: aid as a percentage of GNI
Arab countries have been rather generous donors in the past if generosity is measured in
terms of aid as a percentage of the donors’ gross national income (GNI). Indeed, except
for very recent years, Arab donors have been more generous and often substantially
more generous than western donors. How generous Arab donors exactly are is difficult
to say due to two things: First, as mentioned in the last section, the total amount of Arab
aid is somewhat difficult to establish with certainty. Second, and more importantly, the
GNI of Arab countries is more difficult to estimate accurately than that of western
donors as their GNI is heavily dependent on oil and natural gas extraction. Table 3
provides estimates of the net ODA to GNI ratio of Arab donors over the period 1975 to
1999 (GNI data taken from World Bank 2001). Note that again, no data for individual
countries are available after 1989.
An important and distinctive feature of Arab aid-giving that has been alluded to already
in the last section is its volatility, which not only shows in the absolute amount of aid
given, but also in terms of the amount of aid given as a percentage of GNI. What
explains this volatility of generousness in Arab aid-giving? Round and Odedokun
(2002) show that the donor country’s income, the extent of military adventurism as well
as characteristics of the donor country’s political system determine aid generousness by
DAC donors across countries and time. Clearly with Arab aid, military adventurism is
not an issue and their political system is rather homogeneous both across donors and
time. However, what about income, is it a determinant of aid generousness as is the case
for many western donors? Column II of Table 2 presents results for the same model as
in the last section, but this time the dependent variable is the net ODA-to-GNI ratio and
we add the log of per capita GNI as a further explanatory variable. Per capita income is
highly insignificant, but the variable measuring rents from oil and natural gas extraction
is still positive and statistically significant. In other words, contrary to western
countries, Arab donors’ generousness of aid giving depends on the total profits from
natural resource extraction, but not on their per capita income levels. The Gulf War
dummy no longer is significant. The reason is probably that the Gulf War not only
brought total aid volumes down, but also the GNI of Arab donors. The time trend is
more significant than was the case when total aid volume was the dependent variable.
Over time, Arab donors have become substantially less generous. The importance of the
time trend can also be seen in comparing the R-squared of our model with the one of the
detrended dependent variable. The R-squared falls from 0.85 to 0.31. This implies an
increasing extent of aid fatigue of Arab donors over time.
It is important to note that the figures contained in Table 3 potentially underestimate the
generosity of Arab aid-giving, however. This is because the GNI of Arab aid donors
mainly derives from the extraction of non-renewable resources and is likely to be
inflated. Since such extraction leads to exaggerated income figures given that the partial
liquidation of capital (the resource stock) is erroneously counted as true income
(Neumayer 1999, 2000), actual GNI is lower and the aid provision to GNI ratio
therefore higher than the published figures would suggest (see also Raffer and Singer
[1996: 124ff.]). Representatives from Arab donors therefore rightly argue that ‘Arab aid
represents a greater sacrifice than the aid given by the industrial countries’ since their
aid is ‘deducted from income which is in reality a cash exchange for a depletable natural
resource’ (Shihata 1982: 202). Another aspect to consider is that whilst western
multilateral development agencies can borrow money at very favourable terms from the
international capital markets due to their excellent credit rating, this is not really11
possible for the Arab agencies. Instead, they depend entirely on contributions from
member countries as well as from profits accruing from its lending activities.
Critics of Arab donors have sometimes argued that the huge amount of money given to
the so-called front-states bordering on Israel such as Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon
as well as potentially that given to other Arab countries as well should not be counted as
aid due to its mainly political rather than developmental motivation (Hunter 1984: 180;
Porter 1986; Nonneman 1988). We will see further below that Arab aid indeed is
heavily concentrated on Arab recipient countries. However, if one were to follow such
an argument, then one would also need to deduct from US aid-giving American aid
going to Egypt and Israel, for example, or French aid going to its former colonies.
Indeed, studies of aid allocation such as Berthélemy and Tichit (2002) or Neumayer
(2003b, 2003c) demonstrate that most donors pursue political, economic and other
interests in their aid allocation besides a desire to help poorer countries. Whilst a high
concentration of aid in certain recipient countries represents a problem in and of itself, it
does not imply that such aid should be deducted from the total amount of aid given.
After all, to the recipient country, aid is aid whatever the motives for providing it.
Other critics such as Hunter (1984) have also argued that the seemingly generous Arab
aid is still likely to be lower and perhaps much lower than the economic loss to
developing countries in the form of higher prices for oil and natural gas as a
consequence of OPEC’s exercise of market power. Whatever one might think about
such an argument, in principle there is nothing that forces Arab countries to share a
substantial part of their wealth, which is undoubtedly built on oil and natural gas, with
poorer developing countries in the form of aid. Furthermore, with similar reasoning one
could question whether western countries provide any net financial resources at all to
developing countries given the enormous flows of money going out of developing
countries in order to serve their debt obligations.
Table 3
The generosity of Arab aid-giving compared to DAC aid (in % of GNI)
Period 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
Arab countries 3.48 1.85 1.00 0.94 0.24
Algeria 0.28 0.19 0.09 na na
Iraq 1.20 0.61 -0.04 na na
Libya 0.96 0.51 0.35 na na
Qatar 6.47 2.12 0.18 na na
Kuwait 5.89 3.78 1.58 na na
Saudi Arabia 7.57 4.63 1.57 na na
UAE 8.03 1.87 0.07 na na
DAC countries 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.32 0.24
Note: na: not available.
Source: Van den Boogaerde (1991); OECD (2002b) and earlier similar volumes.
3.4 Geographical allocation
In terms of regions, Arab aid has always been mainly given to Arab countries, then to
Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries with little aid going to Latin American
countries. This is demonstrated in Table 4, which shows the regional allocation of aid in12
five-year averages over the period 1980 to 1999. Note that the aid figures refer to
commitment rather than net ODA disbursements, as the latter is more volatile and
dependent on back flows of money from loans in earlier periods. Arab agencies have
shifted emphasis from Sub-Saharan African towards Arab countries over time. In
comparison, aid from OECD-DAC countries has gone mainly to Asian and Sub-Saharan
African, with less aid going to Arab and more aid going to Latin American countries.
There can be little doubt that western aid is more geographically balanced than Arab
aid. Table 5 provides similar information averaged over the whole time period, but
broken down according to major donor. It is clear that only the OFID is somewhat
geographically more balanced and that the Abu Dhabi Fund is most clearly focused on
Arab recipient countries, apart from the AFESD of course, which provides aid
exclusively to Arab countries.
Looking at the allocation of Arab aid across countries, Neumayer (2003a) finds that
poorer, Arab, Islamic and Sub-Saharan African countries are more likely to receive
some positive amount of Arab aid (gate-keeping stage). The same is true for countries
not maintaining diplomatic relations with Israel as well as those with voting patterns in
the United Nations General Assembly similar to Saudi Arabia. Arab and more populous
countries also receive a higher share of the total aid allocated (level stage). The same is
true for Islamic countries in the case of bilateral aid and countries with voting similarity
in the case of multilateral aid. Donor interest, in particular Arab solidarity, therefore
plays a clear role at both stages, whereas recipient need as measured by a country’s
level of income only affects the gate-keeping stage, not the level stage. The result with
respect to donor interest is similar to western aid, which is also heavily influenced by
the interest of donor countries. However, contrary to Arab donors, western donors also
tend to give more aid to poorer countries (Neumayer 2003b, 2003c).
Table 4
The geographical allocation of aggregate Arab and western aid across regions
Period 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
Arab bilateral country donors
Arab countries 51.0 44.1 61.7 60.3
Non-Arab Africa 15.5 12.6 8.1 20.5
Latin America 0.7 0.8 2.4 3.0
Asia 11.0 18.4 7.9 8.7
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0 0 0.35 2.8
Arab multilateral agency donors
Arab countries 24.5 52.5 73.5 na
Non-Arab Africa 50.6 35.8 19.8 na
Latin America 2.0 1.6 1.6 na
Asia 17.9 9.1 4.4 na
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0 0 0.46 na
DAC
Arab countries 16.4 15.2 19.1 10.1
Non-Arab Africa 24.8 26.4 22.2 20.0
Latin America 10.4 11.5 11.0 11.7
Asia 30.0 29.6 27.6 32.7
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0 0.02 0.53 2.3
Note: na: not available.
Source: OECD (2002a).13
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Arab countries 53.8 45.0 81.6 100 0 54.5 na
Non-Arab Africa 17.3 20.1 7.7 0 100 8.8 49.9*
Latin America 2.2 0.91 0 0 0 0 11.9
Asia 20.9 32.46 10.2 0 0 36.6 37.2*
Eastern Europe and
Central Asia
5.8 1.45 0.4 0 0 0.16 0.8
Note:  na: not available; * includes Arab countries.
Sources: Kuwait Fund (2002); Saudi Fund (2002); OFID (2002); Coordination Secretariat (1998).
3.5 Allocation across income groups
Another important yardstick for analysing aid flows is to look at the allocation of flows
according to income groups, for which Table 6 provides aid commitment data in five-
year averages over the period 1980 to 1999. The share of Arab country aid going to
least developed countries is roughly comparable to that of DAC countries, but Arab
countries give comparatively less to other low income and more to lower middle-
income countries than DAC countries. As concerns Arab multilateral agencies, there is a
dramatic shift away from least developed countries towards lower middle-income
countries. On the whole, western aid is better focused on the poor countries in need of
aid than Arab aid is. This is in accordance with the more rigorous econometric analysis
summarized in the last section.
Table 6
The allocation of Arab and western aid across income groups
Period 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99
Arab bilateral country donors
Least developed countries 20.2 16.2 9.4 16.6
Other low income 6.0 3.2 7.2 15.0
Low middle income 42.8 38.0 69.5 47.1
Upper middle income 5.5 1.6 4.9 24.0
Arab multilateral agency donors
Least developed countries 60.2 50.6 18.9 na
Other low income 15.0 8.0 6.0 na
Low middle income 18.3 34.3 66.4 na
Upper middle income 2.7 2.2 6.8 na
DAC
Least developed countries 23.8 23.4 17.1 16.9
Other low income 20.3 20.7 19.8 24.9
Low middle income 30.5 28.5 34.8 30.1
Upper middle income 4.0 3.7 4.9 4.2
Note: na: not available.
Source: OECD (2002a).14
3.6 Dependency of recipient countries from aid
Given the enormous amounts of aid given to specific Arab countries, particularly those
with a common frontier with Israel, one might think that their aid dependency measured
as the percentage of GNI derived from foreign aid is much higher than that of major
recipients of western aid. It is certainly true that some Arab states derive a substantial
part of their GNI from Arab aid. Jordan and Syria, for example, received around 4 per
cent of their GNI in 1994 and 1992, respectively, and since the figures taken from
Coordination Secretariat (1998) do not contain a substantial part of aid that is never
officially made publicly known, the aid dependency is likely to be higher in reality.
Note, however, that such dependency of aid is not uncommon among recipients. In
1999, Guinea-Bissau’s GNI stemmed to 25 per cent from ODA and Honduras and
Nicaragua derived 15.5 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively, of their GNI from mainly
western aid (OECD 2002b). There can be no doubt that some Arab recipient countries
are dependent from their much richer Arab cousins—in the form of aid, cheap oil
imports and, not least, from remittances of workers making a living in these countries.
But generally speaking the dependency of these Arab recipient countries is no less than
that of many non-Arab developing countries on western aid. Also, the dependency of
recipient countries on Arab aid does not imply that they will always or unreservedly
follow the will of donors. Egypt, for example, signed its peace treaty with Israel,
knowing very well that this would imply that it is cut off from Arab aid and Syria has
never withdrawn from its pro-Soviet (now pro-Russian) and anti-American positions in
spite of receiving aid from anti-Soviet/Russian and pro-American Arab donors.4
3.7  Financial terms of aid
The degree of concessionality is an important aspect of aid for recipient countries.
Grants are better than loans and loans with high concessionality are better than those
with low concessionality. A frequent critique of Arab aid has been that aid to Arab
countries has generally been given in the form of grants, whereas the majority of
developing countries, including the least developed ones, are given loans that
sometimes have low concessionality (Hunter 1984; McKinnon 1997). Western donors,
on the other hand, provide the vast majority of their aid in the form of grants. In
particular, practically all western aid going to least developed countries is in the form of
grants (OECD 2002b).
3.8 Export promotion and tying status
A common critique of aid by western donors is that they use their aid in part at least to
promote their own export interests. This is done in two ways: First, more aid goes to
countries, which are the major importers of the donor country’s goods and services.
Neumayer (2003b, 2003c) finds strong evidence that this is true for most western
donors. In contrast, Neumayer (2003a, 2003c) does not find evidence that this is the
case for Arab aid allocation, even though there have of course always been calls to
make Arab aid work more in the Arab economic and export interests (see, for example,
Khader [1984]). Also, things are slowly changing as Arab donors develop a domestic
industrial base. For example, the Saudi Fund has recently changed its Charter in order to
                                                
4 Of course, Egypt knew equally well that American aid would immediately substitute for Arab aid lost
due its peace treaty with Israel.15
allow for the financing and guarantee of non-oil exports alongside the financing of
development projects (Saudi Fund 2002). BADEA issued a board of governors decision
in 1997, allowing it to ‘intervene in financing Arab African trade’ (BADEA 2002). The
IDB has a trade finance and promotion department and established the Islamic
Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credits (IDB 2002).
Second, sometimes the aid given by western donors is tied towards procurement of
goods and services from the donor country. Western donors differ somewhat from each
other, but most countries tie at least some part of their aid giving (OECD 2002b). Tying
aid usually makes the aid given less valuable as the recipient country cannot buy the
goods and services it wants to buy or at least not at the lowest available price. In
comparison, Arab aid has practically never been tied, with the exception of relatively
unimportant specific loans and grants for oil purchases. This is definitely a positive
aspect of Arab aid, which remains positive even if critics are right in arguing that the
only reason why Arab aid is untied is because they simply do not produce a wide
enough range of goods and services to tie procurement to. However, here as well things
are slowly changing. For example, the Kuwait Fund now states in its ‘Procedures for the
Procurement of Goods and Works’ that ‘with a view to encouraging the participation of
suppliers and contractors from developing countries in the implementation of projects
financed by it, the Fund favours that a margin of preference in awarding contracts be
accorded to local suppliers and contractors in the recipient country and also to suppliers
and contractors from the State of Kuwait who should be treated on the same basis’
(Kuwait Fund 2002; emphasis added).
3.9 Sectoral distribution
Table 7 provides an overview of the sectoral distribution of Arab agencies. It can be
seen that traditional uses such as transport and telecommunications, energy and industry
and mining account for the majority for almost all donors. In contrast, with the
Table 7



























































































































Transport and telecommunications 34.5 33 92.7 18.5 51.1** 17.9 24.3
Energy 21.3 19 0 28.8 7.1 23.4** 20.7
Water and sewerage 11 18* 3.6 10.4 na na 7.1
Agriculture and livestock 17 20 0 21.9 29.1 18.7 16.1
Industry and mining 14.7 8 0 10.7 3.2 20.4 2.5
Others (including health, education,
training, housing, tourism and
balance of payments support)
1.5 na 3.6 9.7 2.1 17.5 20.5
Note: * Includes education, housing, urban development and health; ** includes water and
sewerage; na: not available.
Sources: AFESD (2000); BADEA (2002); IDB (1997), Kuwait Fund (2002); Saudi Fund (2002); OFID
(2002); and Coordination Secretariat (1998).16
exception of the IDB and the OFID, the Arab donors were late in allocating aid to
sectors, which are more important to human development than economic development.
For example, BADEA did not finance any stand-alone social projects before 1995
(BADEA 2000: 16). A comparison with western donors is somewhat difficult given that
sectoral definitions vary, but OECD (2002b: Table 18) reports that about 30 per cent of
OECD-DAC countries’ aid in 1999/2000 went into the social and administrative
infrastructure and there can be no doubt that western donors have put more emphasis on
aspects of human development than Arab donors have so far. Arab donors are slowly
giving more priority to such sectors as health, education and empowerment of women
now, but still have a long way to go to correct a bias towards more visible, but only
seemingly more productive, physical infrastructure projects.
3.10 Development aid philosophy
Particularly in the 1970s and early 1980s Arab donors commonly stated that their aid
aims to develop a new international economic order and self-reliance among developing
countries (Hunter 1984), a philosophy western donors naturally never subscribed to.
However, such rhetoric is no longer apparent.
A still existent and remarkable contrast between Arab and western aid giving is that
Arab donors by and large have either not followed at all or more commonly have
followed only to some extent and after substantial delay the many evolutions—some
would say fads—in development aid thinking of western donor agencies. Indicative of
this tendency to follow the OECD-DAC crowd with delay is the following paragraph in
the 2000 Annual Report of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa:
Through its contribution to sectors the Bank aims at coping with the
changes which development financing has witnessed during the last few
years  whereby efforts are focused on projects for poverty reduction,
improvement in the standard of living of the weaker segments of the
population, food security and environment protection, in addition to
those projects that lead to increased contribution by women to
development, reduce unemployment and support human development
(BADEA 2000: 12; emphasis added).
In particular, Arab donors have never been proactive in advancing the debate on the
proper objectives and design of development aid. Whereas the OECD-DAC has
produced one document after the other on how aid should be designed in order to
promote poverty alleviation, sustainable development, environmental protection, gender
equality, violent conflict prevention, local ownership, effective partnership with
recipient countries, good governance, etc. no similar engagement with such topics can
be discerned from Arab donors.5 It is not quite clear why Arab donors have been
insulated from such developments in the development aid philosophy. They do not face
an active community of non-governmental organizations and are not challenged by a
critical public, of course, which might partly explain why there appears to be little open
                                                
5 The one, but rather limited exception is the Kuwait Fund, which has always assumed a bit the role of a
pioneer amongst Arab donors. It stresses that the promotion of sustainable development is one of its
key aims and that it has insisted on the inclusion of an environmental study in each project report from
as early as the mid-1980s onwards (McKinnon 1997).17
discussion on what aid should achieve in recipient countries and how aid can be
designed better to meet these objectives.
4 Recommendations for the future
From our review and analysis of the institutions of Arab development finance, its
characteristics and trends, a range of recommendations to path the way forward can be
drawn. First, Arab donors should reverse the recent downfall in aid flows and, more
importantly, should strive for a more steady and less volatile flow of aid. They are not
poor by any means and a steady and high flow of aid to poorer developing countries will
help them improve their reputation in the world, which is always under threat due to the
fact that they are amongst the very few high income developing countries. Connected to
this, Arab donors should set themselves a target of aid as a percentage of GNI. The
United Nations recommended target of 0.7 per cent of GNI could serve as a minimum
target. This will help to steady the flow of aid.
Second, there is no need to balance out the regional allocation of Arab aid. The bias
towards Arab countries is natural and the bias towards Sub-Saharan Africa not
unwelcome given the poverty of these countries. The bias against Latin America does
not matter much given the generally higher living standards in these countries and given
that western donors provide substantial amounts of aid to Latin America. There is,
however, a need to reconsider the allocation of Arab aid across income groups. Arab aid
should become better targeted towards the poor and very poor recipient countries.
Connected to this, Arab aid should raise the grant share and raise the concessionality of
loans to the poor and very poor recipient countries.
Third, Arab donors should refrain from following the bad example of western donors to
use aid for the promotion of the donor country’s exports. Finance and institutions for
trade promotion should be kept strictly outside the finance and the institutions
responsible for aid giving. Fourth, Arab donors should re-allocate more resources
towards the ‘soft’ social sectors of human development and away from the ‘hard’
physical infrastructure sectors. Fifth, Arab donors should re-consider the structure of
Arab development finance, which produces some amount of overlap and sometimes
duplication amongst some of the multilateral agencies. A merging of agencies is
probably unrealistic, but it is not clear, for example, why the OFID needs to provide
development finance for Arab and African countries as well when there exist
specialized institutions for both groups of countries. Of course, Arab donors are not
alone in this respect. If anything, the complexity and overlap of western agencies are
even greater. However, there is also no need for Arab donors to repeat the mistakes of
western donors.
Sixth, the Coordination Secretariat should be strengthened. Its role should become
enhanced. It should provide more frequent, more comprehensive and more easily
available statistics on Arab aid-giving and should represent and promote Arab aid to the
outside world. This might imply better staffing of the Secretariat. It should become a
forum in which Arab donors can actively participate in discussions and debates about
the proper objectives and design of development finance. The OECD’s DAC can
function as a role model even though not all the functions of the DAC need to be taken
over by the Coordination Secretariat. Arab donors should more actively participate in18
the discussion of issues surrounding the development aid philosophy. Such a discussion
should be fostered both amongst Arab donors and in constructive exchange with
western donors. As a logical consequence, the main Arab donors should seek closer
cooperation with the DAC in the long run. Joining the DAC is not an option as Arab
donors cannot become OECD members given the differences in the political and
economic systems between them and the OECD countries. However, there is nothing
inherent in aid giving by Arab donors that makes them incompatible with western
donors and would stand against closer cooperation. The current lack of such cooperation
seems to be due to a combination of western countries not taking Arab donors seriously
as partners of development finance—an impression fostered by the recent fall in the
volume of Arab aid-giving—and Arab unwillingness to succumb to the rules of
transparency, peer review and open debate that characterizes the OECD’s DAC.
Following these policy recommendations would help Arab donors to provide more
reliable, better targeted and more effective aid for the twenty-first century. Arab aid
once was an important and highly regarded source of development finance for poorer
developing countries. Arab donors should strive to regain this regard and to do even
better than before.
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